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UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
africaN reGioNal aNd  
suB-reGioNal systems
lanD RigHts case may Have faR-
ReacHing impact fOR inDigenOus 
peOples
In 1973 and 1978, the Kenyan gov-
ernment systematically evicted the semi-
nomadic Endorois people from their tradi-
tional lands in the Great Rift Valley. In place 
of the approximately 60,000 Endorois who 
traditionally used the fertile banks of Lake 
Bogoria for cattle herding, the Kenyan gov-
ernment established a wildlife preserve. As 
a result, the Endorois were forced onto arid 
desert lands where both their livelihood 
and culture have dramatically deteriorated.
After nearly forty years without relief, on 
February 4, 2010 the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights recognized 
the plight of the Endorois people, finding 
the Kenyan government to be in violation 
of Articles 1, 8, 14, 17, 21, and 22 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. The Commission recommended 
that Kenya provide the Endorois commu-
nity both restitution of ancestral lands and 
compensation for damage done to their 
lands and the community since they were 
evicted. The ruling allowed the Kenyan 
government three months to implement the 
Commission’s recommendations, or poten-
tially face litigation before the African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Human rights organizations have hailed 
the Commission’s decision as a landmark 
case for indigenous peoples’ rights and 
considered its implications throughout 
Africa. In particular, the ruling marks 
two developments in Commission jurispru-
dence: never before has the Commission 
recognized an indigenous group to be a 
people entitled to benefit from Charter 
provisions that protect collective rights; 
and never before has the Commission, or 
any other international tribunal, declared a 
violation of the right to development.
In defining a “people,” the Commission 
recognized that “indigenous peoples have 
an unambiguous relationship to a distinct 
territory and that all attempts to define the 
concept [of a people] recognise the linkages 
between people, their land, and culture.” 
The Commission relied on the Endorois’s 
self-identification as a distinct community, 
objective features of the Endorois commu-
nity, and the close interconnection between 
their culture, religion, traditional way of 
life, and their ancestral lands, as evidence 
of the Endorois being a people.
In assessing the right to develop-
ment under Article 22 of the Charter, the 
Commission asserted that there are both 
procedural and substantive elements that 
must be met to satisfy this right. In this 
case, the Kenyan government’s failure to 
consult the community and obtain its prior 
consent in accordance with its customs 
and traditions, and the government’s fail-
ure to provide land of equal value to the 
land taken violated the Endorois’s right to 
development.
If fully implemented, this decision 
could have a significant impact on the 
Endorois people and far-reaching repercus-
sions throughout Africa. The Commission’s 
expanded definition of a “people” and 
articulation of the right to development 
establish standards that will be applied 
in future cases involving other African 
indigenous groups who have lost ances-
tral land through government acquisition. 
Most importantly, both components of the 
Endorois precedent indicate a shift toward 
greater protection of the rights of minori-
ties whose attachment to land is vital but 
traditionally outside the mainstream legal 
framework for land ownership.
gamBia’s cOmpliance WitH tHe 
ecOWas cOuRt
On February 17, 2010, the Economic 
Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Community Court of Justice 
granted Gambia’s request to postpone 
until April 27, 2010 the initial hearing 
in the case of Gambian journalist Musa 
Saidykhan. In November 2007, the human 
rights watchdog Media Foundation for 
West Africa initiated the lawsuit against 
Gambia on behalf of Saidykhan, who cur-
rently resides in exile in the United States. 
The complaint alleges that Saidykhan, 
former Editor-in-Chief of the Gambian 
Independent, was detained and tortured by 
the Gambian National Intelligence Agency 
on March 28, 2006, after the newspaper 
printed the names of suspects in the March 
21 attempted coup d’état. At the initial 
hearing, Saidykhan and his doctor were 
scheduled to give testimony concerning 
the injuries he sustained while in detention. 
Although Gambia’s history of contentious 
relations with the Court makes implemen-
tation of an outcome in Saidykhan’s favor 
questionable, Gambia’s continued engage-
ment with the Court and other ECOWAS 
organs is reason for optimism.
President Yahya Jammeh has repeat-
edly sought to limit the effectiveness of the 
Court. In a 2008 case with similar facts to 
Saidykhan’s, where the Court declared the 
Gambian government’s arrest of reporter 
Ebrima Manneh “illegal” and urged his 
release and compensation, Jammeh refused 
to enforce the Court’s ruling. Neither wide-
spread criticism nor the fact that Gambia’s 
rejection of the Court’s ruling contravened 
Article 24 of the 2005 Supplementary 
Protocol of the Court, which makes rul-
ings binding on Member States, induced 
Jammeh’s compliance. Separately, in an 
effort to limit individuals’ standing before 
the Court, in September 2009 Jammeh 
attempted to amend the Court’s protocol 
to make exhaustion of domestic remedies 
a prerequisite.
Notwithstanding Jammeh’s overt protest 
of the Court, Gambia’s continued engage-
ment with the Court and other ECOWAS 
institutions and agencies may tacitly bolster 
the legitimacy of the sub-regional court. By 
participating in Court proceedings, even 
when such involvement entails submitting 
requests for postponement, Gambia dem-
onstrates recognition of the Court’s author-
ity. Indeed, Gambia’s latest maneuver in 
the Saidykhan case marks the second occa-
sion on which government lawyers have 
contested the proceedings, thereby dem-
onstrating a genuine concern for potential 
outcomes. The Court’s legitimacy may also 
be augmented by Gambia’s involvement in 
other associated ECOWAS organs, such 
as the Commission, and its ratification of 
ECOWAS treaties. For example, Gambia is 
currently undergoing the process of acced-
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ing to the 2009 ECOWAS Convention on 
Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their 
Ammunition, and Other Related Materials. 
Gambia’s involvement in ECOWAS organs 
and treaties could create interdependencies 
between Member States that will enable 
effective political pressure to encourage 
compliance with the Court’s future rulings.
If Gambia fails to comply with a judg-
ment in the Saidykhan case, sanctions 
could result pursuant to Article 77 of the 
1993 revised ECOWAS Treaty. The fact 
that no sanctions resulted from Gambia’s 
non-compliance with the Manneh judg-
ment demonstrates that this power is 
not readily invoked. However, Gambia’s 
greater involvement in the Saidykhan case 
may indicate a change in Gambia’s rela-
tionship with the Court, perhaps leading 
toward greater compliance.
a DevelOping ecOWas pROviDes 
HOpe fOR RestORatiOn Of DemOcRacy 
in nigeR
On February 18, 2010, Niger expe-
rienced its third coup d’état in fourteen 
years. The coup was a response to President 
Mamadou Tandja’s bid to retain the presi-
dency for a third term in violation of the 
1999 Constitution of the Fifth Republic 
of Niger. News reports suggest that the 
coup was welcomed in Niger, as pro-coup 
demonstrators took to the streets in cel-
ebration. However, reaction from the inter-
national community was far less jubilant. 
The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) adopted a reso-
lution condemning the coup as a violation 
of Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union (AU). Additionally, UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a 
statement disapproving of the unconstitu-
tional change of government. Now that the 
coup’s leaders are at the helm of Niger’s 
central government, it is unclear how soon 
Niger will return to democratic rule and 
what tools may be available to Nigeriens to 
ensure this transition takes place.
ECOWAS, through its capacity to coor-
dinate diplomatic negotiations, impose 
sanctions, and conduct trials, is uniquely 
positioned to facilitate such a transition. 
Indeed, ECOWAS played a central role 
in Guinea’s return to democratic rule in 
February 2010 following a December 2008 
military coup after the death of General 
Lasana Conté, Guinea’s dictatorial leader 
of 24 years. ECOWAS suspended Guinea’s 
membership within the regional organiza-
tion, convened negotiations between coup 
leaders and pro-democracy groups, and 
marshaled diplomatic pressure from west-
ern and African countries. However, over 
a year of military rule and grave human 
rights abuses transpired before Guinea 
returned to democracy.
In Niger, ECOWAS has again assumed 
a central role. It suspended Niger’s mem-
bership in October 2009 because Tandja 
dissolved Parliament and the Constitutional 
Court flouted Niger’s obligation to promote 
democratic governance under Article 4(j) of 
the ECOWAS Revised Treaty. Additionally, 
since several months before the coup, 
ECOWAS has coordinated diplomatic 
efforts to resolve tensions in Niger through 
negotiations. However, the recent coup rep-
resents a significant setback to ECOWAS’s 
pre-coup diplomacy, and it is uncertain 
whether negotiations and sanctions alone 
will restore democracy in Niger.
In this context, the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice represents 
one additional mechanism that could be 
employed to encourage a return to demo-
cratic rule. With wide jurisdictional leeway 
to pursue cases of human rights viola-
tions and broad access to the court for 
individuals pursuant to Articles 9(4) and 
10(d) of the 2005 Supplementary Protocol 
(A/SP.1/01/05), the Court is well situated 
to hear a case challenging the legality of 
the military junta under Article 13 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. Moreover, as seen in the ECOWAS 
case of Ugokwe v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (Unreported Suit No. ECW/CCJ/
APP/02/05), a claim can be filed before 
the Court based on alleged violations of 
the African Charter and the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights relating to 
national elections. If successful in restoring 
democracy in Niger — whether through 
legal action or diplomacy and sanctions — 
ECOWAS’s growing role in West Africa 
could serve as a model to other sub-
regional organizations on the continent.
Andrew W. Maki, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the African Regional and 
Sub-Regional Systems for the Human 
Rights Brief.
europeaN court of humaN riGhts
uk’s “stOp anD seaRcH” pOlicy 
DeclaReD a Human RigHts viOlatiOn
On January 12, 2010, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deter-
mined that Sections 44-45 of the United 
Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 (Terrorism 
Act), which provide police with significant 
discretion to “stop and search” individuals, 
violate the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). In Gillan and Quinton 
v. United Kingdom, police independently 
stopped the applicants, two British citizens, 
and searched their personal belongings dur-
ing a protest at an arms fair on September 
9, 2003. Each detention lasted less than 
thirty minutes, and when neither search 
revealed any incriminating evidence, the 
officers released the applicants. In each 
instance, the only explanation for appre-
hending the applicants was the exercise of 
the Terrorism Act’s stop-and-search pow-
ers. The applicants alleged violations of 
four provisions of the Convention: Article 
5 (the right to liberty and security); Article 
8 (the right to respect for private and family 
life); Article 10 (freedom of expression); 
and Article 11 (freedom of assembly and 
association).
The Terrorism Act, signed into law in 
February 2001, affords police officers wide 
discretion to stop and search individuals 
without reasonable suspicion if the officers 
believe apprehension would be “expedient 
for the prevention of acts of terrorism.” 
Officers ranked as assistant chief constable 
or higher may assign subordinates a geo-
graphic zone of a public area within which 
to conduct searches. Section 45(2) allows 
the officers to apprehend anyone within 
their assigned area to search for “articles 
of a kind which could be used in connec-
tion with terrorism,” even absent grounds 
for suspicion. Although Section 45(3) pro-
hibits police from “requir[ing] a person 
to remove any clothing in public except 
for headgear, footwear, an outer coat, a 
jacket or gloves,” a Code of Practice (Code 
A) issued by the UK Secretary of State 
permits more invasive public searches. 
Under Code A, the Terrorism Act does not 
“prevent an officer from placing his or her 
hand inside the pockets of the outer cloth-
ing, . . . collars, socks and shoes,” or from 
searching a person’s hair.
Using a two-part test, the ECtHR held 
that the stop-and-search police power of 
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sections 44 and 45 of the Terrorism Act 
violates ECHR Article 8 and, therefore, did 
not consider the applicants’ other claims. 
Applying the first prong, the Court found 
that the Terrorism Act interferes with the 
right to respect for private and family life, 
notwithstanding the fact that most searches 
under the Terrorism Act occur in public. 
Noting that Article 8 encompasses an indi-
vidual’s interactions with others, even those 
occurring in public, the decision labels the 
law “a clear interference” with Article 8 
because it subjects individuals to such per-
sonal searches in public areas, leading to 
embarrassment of those searched.
Second, the Court found that the inter-
ference was not “in accordance with the 
law” because it did not provide “adequate 
legal safeguards” to protect “against arbi-
trary interference” with an individual’s 
Article 8 rights. The section 44 require-
ment that searches be “expedient” in pre-
venting terrorism is too broad, accord-
ing to the Court. Reading “expedient” to 
mean only “helpful” or “advantageous,” 
the Court held that this section reserves too 
much discretion for police in apprehending 
and searching individuals.
The decision expresses particular con-
cern over use of the stop-and-search provi-
sions to target racial minorities and political 
activists. From 2007 to 2008, despite the 
fact that Caucasians composed 92.1 percent 
of the UK’s population, only 61 percent 
of pedestrians stopped under Section 44 
were Caucasian. Additionally, the ECtHR 
cites a study by the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights indicating 
abuse of Section 44 in detaining journalists 
and protestors at events garnering political 
attention, such as the arms fair where the 
police apprehended the applicants.
This decision fuels the debate over the 
continually shifting line between prevent-
ing terrorism and preserving individual 
rights, particularly because Article 8 allows 
public officials to interfere with the right 
to privacy to protect the security and well-
being of the state and its citizens. David 
Hanson, the Minister of State for Crime 
and Policing at the UK’s Home Office, 
argued that the Act’s stop and search was 
“an important tool” used in the UK’s 
“ongoing fight against terrorism.” Rights 
groups including Liberty, which provided 
counsel to the applicants, called on the 
government to “tighten up the law without 
delay.” The UK plans to appeal the decision 
to the ECtHR Grand Chamber and will 
continue using the stop-and-search provi-
sions until the appeal is resolved.
eu tO JOin tHe euROpean cOnventiOn 
On Human RigHts: a step fORWaRD 
OR BackWaRD in ResOlving Human 
RigHts viOlatiOns?
On March 17, 2010, the European 
Commission proposed directives for nego-
tiations on the European Union’s forth-
coming accession to the ECHR. While the 
ECHR already binds each individual EU 
Member State to secure the rights articu-
lated in its articles, the EU and its institu-
tions would also be bound and subject to 
suit before the ECtHR after accession is 
complete. This step represents a significant 
milestone in the integration of European 
international organizations, since the 
ECtHR is a subsidiary of the Council of 
Europe, which is an independent political 
organization from the EU.
After a 1996 European Court of Justice 
decision rejected accession for lack of 
treaty support, EU accession became 
legally permissible and also mandatory 
under the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into 
force on December 1, 2009. Protocol 14 
to the ECHR, which will enter into force 
in June 2010, also permits the EU’s acces-
tHe euROpean cOuRt Of Human 
RigHts scRutinizes italy’s asylum 
pOlicy
The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) is considering a landmark law-
suit against Italy filed by a group of 
asylum seekers originating from Somalia 
and Eritrea (Hirsi and Others v. Italy, 
Application No. 27765/09). 
Since May 2009, Italy’s “push-back 
policy,” whereby mainly African people 
trying to reach Italian shores by boat are 
intercepted in international waters and 
brought to other countries such as Libya, 
led to the return of at least 900 indi-
viduals in only two months. This policy 
failed to guarantee the examination of 
asylum seekers’ possible claims. However, 
according to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
a substantial number of people from this 
group are in need of international pro-
tection. Several international organiza-
tions, such as the UNHCR, Amnesty 
International, and Human Rights Watch, 
have criticized Italy’s push-back practices.
The lawsuit before the ECtHR was 
initiated in July 2009 by 24 asylum 
seekers who were transferred to Libya 
after being intercepted. One of them 
subsequently died in another attempt to 
reach the Italian coast in November 2009. 
Some of the plaintiffs are currently living 
in detention centers or overcrowded pris-
ons, susceptible to ill-treatment.
According to Anton Giulio Lana, 
a Rome-based lawyer representing the 
plaintiffs, Italy’s policy violates three 
provisions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR): the prohibi-
tion of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment (Article 3); the prohibition of 
collective expulsion of aliens (Article 4 
of Protocol 4 to the ECHR); and the right 
to an effective legal remedy (Article 13).
Italy gave its statement to the ECtHR 
in April 2010. The plaintiffs have one 
month to reply, after which the Court will 
make its decision, hopefully in a reason-
able time. The UNHCR has submitted a 
written intervention as a third party to 
the ECtHR, concluding that “by return-
ing persons to Libya without an adequate 
assessment of their protection needs, the 
Italian authorities appear not to have suf-
ficiently taken into account the potential 
risk of refoulement, including indirect 
refoulement, and other possible viola-
tions of fundamental rights upon return 
of the affected persons to Libya.”
This case is extremely important as 
it is the first time that the ECtHR will 
examine the practice of intercepting and 
returning migrants without human rights 
guarantees. Such policies are carried out 
not only by Italy, but also by Spain and 
Greece. If the Court decides in favor of 
the applicants, many more similar cases 
may be filed.
Editor’s Note: For more information on 
the controversial Italian interdiction 
policy, see Annamaria Racota, Europe: 
Italy’s Immigration Policy Faces New 
Criticism, 17 No. 1 hum. rTs. BrieF 45.
Michèle Morel, a Ph.D. researcher at 
Ghent University, Belgium, contributed 
this column on the European Court of 
Human Rights to the Human Rights Brief.
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sion. Although neither document makes the 
EU a member of the Council of Europe, the 
Lisbon Treaty does allow the EU to receive 
representation on the ECtHR, representa-
tion and votes in the Council of Ministers 
on issues related to the Court, and repre-
sentation on the Parliamentary Assembly 
when it selects judges for the ECtHR.
In a 2009 draft report, the European 
Parliament enumerated several benefits 
of EU accession to the ECHR. Once the 
EU is bound by the ECHR, individual 
citizens and Member States may bring 
complaints against the EU and its institu-
tions for acts believed to be incompatible 
with the Convention, thereby expanding 
human rights protections. Politically, the 
Commission expects the move will harmo-
nize both the law of the European Court 
of Human Rights and the European Court 
of Justice, and the policies of the EU and 
the Council of Europe. Furthermore, bind-
ing the EU to the ECHR will potentially 
“enhance the credibility of the [EU]” in its 
negotiations with third countries; non-EU 
Member States will be more likely to heed 
the EU’s call for adherence to the ECHR 
and decisions of the ECtHR if the EU itself 
is also bound.
While José Manuel Barroso, President 
of the European Commission, believes the 
accession holds “political, legal and sym-
bolic importance,” the process is not with-
out flaws. The ECtHR already struggles 
with an ever-growing caseload. Adding an 
entire international organization to the list 
of parties that may be sued will — to say 
the least — not help solve this problem. 
The Parliament’s draft report acknowl-
edged that unless the structure of the 
ECtHR is amended to alleviate the burden 
of “the excessive workload” and repetitive 
cases on the Court, “the system is in dan-
ger of collapse.” The draft report relies on 
Protocol 14 to ameliorate this problem. To 
improve efficiency and allow the Court to 
cope with the increasing caseload, Protocol 
14 allows for three-judge committees to 
issue judgments and for a single judge 
to determine admissibility. Because the 
Protocol 14 reforms have not yet entered 
into force, however, its effect on the Court’s 
efficiency remains unknown.
EU accession will afford greater poten-
tial to redress human rights violations in 
Europe. According to President Barroso, 
“The EU’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights will pro-
vide a coherent system of fundamental 
rights protection throughout the continent,” 
ensuring compliance with the ECHR by the 
EU institutions and symbolizing Europe’s 
universal commitment to preserving 
human rights. The accession will become 
official upon the unanimous approval of 
the Commission’s directives by both the 
Council and all 47 current States Parties 
to the ECHR, and with the Parliament’s 
permission.
gRanD cHamBeR tO examine DeatH Of 
g8 pROtestOR
A five-judge panel of the ECtHR Grand 
Chamber accepted referral requests by 
both the Italian government and the parents 
of Carlo Giuliani, an Italian protester killed 
at the 2001 Group of Eight conference 
in Genoa, Italy. On August 25, 2009, the 
Court issued a Chamber judgment find-
ing that Italy violated Article 2, the right 
to life, by failing to conduct an adequate 
investigation of the incident. The Court did 
not, however, find that the officer who shot 
Giuliani used excessive force.
Following the Chamber judgment, 
Giuliani’s parents vowed to challenge the 
latter finding, seeking to hold the state 
responsible for the carabiniere’s excessive 
use of force. The Chamber was unable 
to find for the applicants on this issue 
because Giuliani’s body had been cre-
mated and the scene of the shooting altered 
before adequate ballistic investigation 
could be conducted. Therefore, a finding 
by the Grand Chamber that the carabiniere 
applied excessive force appears unlikely. 
The appeal hearing is set for September 
29, 2010.
Editor’s Note: For a complete analysis of 
the Court’s decision, see Whitney Hayes, 
European Court of Human Rights: Death 
of Italian G8 Protester Not a Violation of 
Right to Life, 17 No. 1 hum. rTs. BrieF 59.
Whitney Hayes, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the European Court of 
Human Rights for the Human Rights Brief.
iNter-americaN system
iactHR finDs mexicO viOlateD 
cOnventiOn On eRaDicatiOn Of 
viOlence against WOmen
On November 16, 2009, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
issued an opinion finding Mexico violated 
the American Convention of Human Rights 
(ACHR) for failing to effectively investi-
gate, prosecute, and prevent the murders 
of Claudia Ivette González, Esmeralda 
Herrera Monreal, and Laura Berenice 
Ramos Monárrez.
In González and others (“Campo 
Algodonero or Cotton Field”) v. México, 
the Court established jurisdiction to hear 
and decide cases based on violations of 
the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women (Convention of 
Belém do Pará), which Mexico ratified on 
November 12, 1998.
Two of the three female victims in 
Campo Algodonero were minors. All three 
bodies were discovered on November 2001 
in an abandoned cotton field. These mur-
ders are among many cases of disappear-
ance, rape, and murder of women and girls 
in Ciudad Juárez, a city on the U.S.-Mexico 
border. Unfortunately, many of these cases 
have been poorly investigated by Mexican 
authorities and remain unsolved. The irreg-
ular prosecution, investigation, and preven-
tion of these crimes has led to widespread 
impunity and continued serious gender-
based violence against women and girls in 
Ciudad Juárez.
Following the IACtHR’s landmark deci-
sion in Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, 
Campo Algodonero underscores that states 
can be liable under international human 
rights law for failing to exercise due dili-
gence when investigating and responding 
to gender-based violence committed by 
private actors. In other words, even though 
the Court could not find that the mur-
ders were committed through state action, 
Campo Algodonero holds Mexico inter-
nationally responsible for failing to effec-
tively prevent, investigate, and prosecute 
the murders of the three women.
Article 1 of the ACHR provides that 
States Parties have the obligation to respect 
the rights in the Convention. This obliga-
tion includes the duty to ensure that all 
persons subject to its jurisdiction have free 
and full exercise of the rights and freedoms 
without any discrimination on the basis of 
gender, race, or any other social condition. 
Article 2 of the ACHR declares that States 
Parties have a duty to adopt legislative or 
any other measures as may be necessary 
to give effect to the rights and freedoms 
recognized by the Convention. In Campo 
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Algodonero, the Court found that Mexico 
violated the ACHR by failing to guarantee, 
protect, respect, and adopt necessary mea-
sures to give effect to the Convention, spe-
cifically its guarantees of the rights to life, 
humane treatment, and personal liberty.
Remarkably, the Court also decided 
for the first time whether it had jurisdic-
tion to hear claims based on violations of 
the Convention of Belém do Pará. Mexico 
argued that the IACtHR did not have 
jurisdiction because the Convention of 
Belém do Pará did not specifically grant it 
such jurisdiction. The IACtHR disagreed, 
explaining that international human rights 
law is composed of both a set of rules and 
a set of values. In this case, the IACtHR 
interpreted the rules that determine juris-
diction of the Convention of Belém do Pará 
by taking into account the values the Inter-
American System intends to safeguard and 
protect.
Campo Algodonero also recognized that 
gender-specific violence can constitute 
femicide and allocated state responsibil-
ity for failing to protect women from such 
violence. Femicide is an extreme form of 
violence against women; it is the murder of 
girls and women for the sole reason of their 
gender. In Campo Algodonero, the Court 
concluded that the petitioners were vic-
tims of violence against women and held 
Mexico responsible for failing to prevent 
these crimes because the Mexican govern-
ment was aware of the pattern of violence 
yet it failed to prevent it.
iactHR cOnDemns use Of 
manDatORy DeatH penalty in 
BaRBaDOs
The IACtHR found that Barbados’s 
violated Tyrone DaCosta Cadogan’s rights 
guaranteed under Articles 4 (right to life) 
and 8 (right to fair trial) of the ACHR 
when it sentenced him to death by hang-
ing, pursuant to a Barbadian statute that 
requires capital punishment for murder. 
DaCosta Cadogan v. Barbados, decided 
September 24, 2009, is the second time 
the tribunal denounced a Barbadian stat-
ute requiring the death penalty in murder 
cases. Significantly, the Court considered 
for the first time whether a law that only 
makes available, rather than requiring, a 
psychiatric evaluation for a defendant fac-
ing the death penalty satisfies due process 
requirements under Article 8 of the ACHR.
Article 8 of the ACHR requires states 
to ensure that every person has the right to 
a hearing with due guarantees and within 
a reasonable time by a competent, inde-
pendent, and impartial tribunal previously 
established by law. This obligation is most 
exacting when the death penalty may be 
imposed.
During proceedings before the IACtHR, 
Cadogan was evaluated and diagnosed with 
personality disorder as well as alcohol 
dependence. However, during his criminal 
trial in Barbados, he was not evaluated by 
a mental health professional. The Court 
found that the state violated Cadogan’s 
right to a fair trial because neither the trial 
judge nor the defense attorney requested a 
psychiatric evaluation, which could have 
allowed Cadogan to raise the defense of 
diminished responsibility.
While Barbadian law provides that all 
criminal defendants are entitled to a full 
psychiatric evaluation by a state-employed 
mental health professional, the judge is not 
required to request or explicitly inform the 
accused that the evaluation is available. 
The state’s passive conduct in Cadogan, the 
IACtHR held, constituted a violation of the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Even though 
the state’s omission may not have violated 
due process rights in other criminal pro-
ceedings, Cadogan’s case demanded the 
most ample and strict observation of due 
process because it involved the possibility 
of a mandatory death sentence. Moreover, 
considering Cadogan was afforded state-
appointed legal, the judge had the duty to 
adopt a more active role in ensuring that 
all necessary measures were carried out in 
order to guarantee a fair trial. The Court 
explained that Cadogan’s particular situa-
tion at the time of the offense reasonably 
required at least an assessment of whether 
alcohol dependency or some personality 
disorder existed, especially because the 
judge submitted before the jury the issue of 
the effect that alcohol and drugs may have 
had on the accused’s mental state.
Cadogan’s broad interpretation of the 
state’s obligation to ensure due process to 
include the mandatory offer of a mental 
health evaluation in a capital punishment 
case is remarkable in that it creates an 
affirmative obligation on the state not only 
to ensure that all criminals are able to have 
a free and full psychiatric evaluation by a 
state-employed mental health professional, 
but also that they are aware that this evalu-
ation is available prior to judgment.
iacHR cOnDemns vagueness Of 
amnesty DecRee in HOnDuRas
On January 27, 2010, Honduran 
president Porfirio Lobo Sosa signed 
an Amnesty Decree (Decree No. 2) for 
political and common crimes committed 
between January 1, 2008 and January 27, 
2010, a period of civil strife that followed 
the coup d’état that deposed the demo-
cratically-elected President José Manuel 
Zelaya. Amnesty International reported 
serious human rights abuses during these 
months, including arbitrary arrests, police 
and military abuse, suppression of speech, 
and several episodes of violence against 
women.
On February 3, 2010, the IACHR 
expressed concern with the Amnesty 
Decree, noting that its ambiguous lan-
guage did not establish precise criteria or 
a concrete mechanism for its application. 
It urged Honduran authorities to review the 
decree and remember Honduras’s obliga-
tions under international law.
The IACHR’s concern is warranted 
as the Decree could result in widespread 
impunity of serious human rights viola-
tions. Moreover, the IACHR noted that 
amnesty laws that hinder access to justice 
in cases involving serious human right vio-
lations contravene Honduras’s obligations 
under the ACHR. As a State Party to the 
ACHR, Honduras is required to ensure that 
its laws do not deprive victims of serious 
human rights violations access to justice. 
Moreover, it may not invoke existing provi-
sions of domestic law, such as an amnesty 
decree, to avoid complying with its obliga-
tions under international law. Honduras 
may therefore not use the Amnesty Decree 
to justify its failure to prosecute and punish 
human rights violations.
Daniela X. Cornejo, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the Inter-American System 
for the Human Rights Brief.
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Dinah Shelton was recently elected 
to serve as one of seven members of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, and is the first woman to be nomi-
nated by the United States for this position. 
Shelton has experience advising and work-
ing with regional human rights systems, 
has authored countless articles and books 
on human rights law, and is a profes-
sor at George Washington University Law 
School.
Human Rights Brief: You have a very 
broad perspective on regional protection of 
human rights. We have textbooks of yours 
that are volumes long. How do you see this 
new role with the Commission fitting into 
your overall work and how did you come to 
this point in your career?
Dinah shelton: It is certainly a differ-
ent role. When you sit outside and look 
at the Commission, comparing it to other 
human rights bodies, you can have the 
outsider perspective to critique areas in 
which you see some real problems. When 
you get inside, you see the source of those 
problems and you see that perhaps in some 
areas it is easy to move relatively quickly 
to correct them and other areas where it is 
a more long-term and perhaps intractable 
problem.
HRB: What do you see coming up in 
the short-term future?
D.s.: One of the problems is that 
the Commission is a part-time body and 
human rights problems are not. So, when 
you have a seven-member Commission and 
none of the members of the Commission 
live in Washington, D.C., it means that the 
Commission members themselves have 
limited interaction with the staff, with the 
files, with the pleadings and the memos 
that are deposited, etc. And, of course we 
all have our day jobs, which is another 
problem. I think we are all trying to be 
more proactive in terms of looking at the 
cases that come in. I think we have a very 
collegial committee right now, and one that 
is eager to make the process work as best 
it can.
HRB: Are there any particular areas 
of focus that you would like to see given 
attention in the Commission during these 
next few years?
D.s.: We each have our country rappor-
teurships and a thematic rapporteurship. 
I have the rights of indigenous peoples, 
which alone would keep me busy if that 
were the only thing I had to do in the next 
four years. One of the striking things about 
this first session of the Commission [in 
March 2010] is the high level of represen-
tation governments are sending to the hear-
ings. It is not like twenty years ago when 
governments, on the whole, never really 
responded to the Commission. I think it 
gives us more of an opportunity to promote 
human rights instead of trying to put out 
major forest fires.
There is a third pillar, along with 
human rights and democracy, that I think 
is critically important, and that I think 
the Commission is going to start looking 
at in more depth: the rule of law. When 
you put together the components of a just 
society, you want human rights, democ-
racy, and rule of law. But, until recently, 
rule of law has not gotten the same focus 
as democracy and human rights. Some of 
the problems that continue to occur within 
the hemisphere are very closely linked in 
many countries to problems with the lack 
of an independent and competent judiciary. 
I think this is something that some of the 
new members on the Commission have 
given high priority.
HRB: At the end of 2009, the Court 
issued new Rules of Procedure with a 
somewhat new role for the Commission. 
It also mentioned the creation of an 
Inter-American public defender as part 
of the reforms. Do you see any changes 
or challenges in the adjustment of the 
Commission’s role in proceedings before 
the Court?
D.s.: Not really. Actually, I think it may 
improve consideration of cases because 
as the role of individuals and their repre-
sentatives before the Court has increased, 
their focus is on repairing the harm to 
the individuals involved in the case. The 
Commission’s role becomes, then, increas-
ingly one similar to a ministerio público 
(a governmental office in many Latin 
American countries that performs func-
tions similar to those of a public prosecu-
tor). That is, the Commission has taken on 
the role of upholding the public interest in 
the hemisphere, looking not back at what 
happened to the victim so much as forward 
to changes in law and practice in the par-
ticular society.
I see these two roles as very comple-
mentary and the adjustment really allows 
the Commission to focus on the changes 
that need to be made as we look forward in 
trying to prevent human rights violations 
from occurring again. Of course, one of 
the developments is the creation of a Legal 
Defense Fund to help litigants, and we’re 
still in the process of figuring how that’s 
going to operate. But, I think that if the 
appellants get experienced representation, 
that again will just enhance the proceed-
ings before the Court.
HRB: A lot of the earlier discussions 
in the Inter-American human rights system 
compared it to the European human rights 
system, which eventually merged their 
versions of the Court and Commission. 
Are there particular advantages for the 
Inter-American system of maintaining two 
human rights bodies?
D.s.: Absolutely. We should never 
go the European route. In the European 
context, until recently, my guess would 
be that 90 to 95 percent of cases were 
purely issues of law. There was no fac-
tual disagreement whatsoever between 
the petitioners and the government. The 

























iNterVieW: diNah sheltoN,  a NeW commissioNer at the iNter-americaN commissioN oN humaN riGhts
64
or this particular practice in violation of 
the Convention?” It is the reverse in the 
Inter-American system where, in cases of 
alleged extrajudicial killings or disappear-
ances, the facts are critical. If you have 
1,200 cases and the facts are in dispute 
in 95 percent of them, the Inter-American 
Court would never be able to do the kind 
of fact-finding necessary, and would be 
relying almost entirely on presumptions 
and inferences.
I think one of the advantages the 
Commission has now is that several coun-
tries have an open-door policy. We can 
go any time we want to look into issues 
that may come up in the context of a par-
ticular case. I think the fact-finding the 
Commission does is really critical to the 
whole system being able to function.
HRB: How was the nomination process 
going into the Commission?
D.s.: I was nominated in March 2009. 
There is really a role for NGOs and human 
rights advocates to play in this process. 
Normally there are discussions within 
the U.S. Mission to the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and within the legal 
department of the U.S. State Department 
about people who are within the realm of 
possibility as nominees.
And then, of course, there is the three-
month campaign between the nomina-
tion and the actual election. That, again, 
involves meeting with NGOs to elicit sup-
port and trying to get them to contact their 
counterparts in other countries, because it’s 
an election by 34 of the 35 Member States. 
(Cuba does not participate.) So, we make 
the rounds to all the state missions to the 
OAS and speak with the different ambas-
sadors and legal advisors, answer their 
questions, and make public presentations.
In my election it came down to the final 
ballot because the two candidates vying 
for the third seat were tied with one vote 
left to count. So, it was tense. It was closer 
than past elections we have had. I will say 
that I found the campaign extremely useful 
because I could hear the concerns of each 
of the different countries. So, it did not just 
serve the nomination process but it also 
prepared me to sit on the Commission now.
I think the only unfortunate thing, 
although I really like my two new col-
leagues, is that the person1 who lost the 
election was a nominee for a second term. 
There is certainly a perception among 
many that the reason that he did not get 
a second term was that he was too good, 
and that because he was the rapporteur on 
a couple of the countries2 that are among 
those most seriously criticized today. There 
was a campaign against him to make him 
personally pay for the human rights work 
that he had done, and it was a success-
ful campaign. So, that is a bit disturbing. 
I think that the new commissioners who 
have come in, if they want to do their job 
well, have to take the position that they 
are not concerned about their second term. 
Because if they are, they will not do the job 
that they are supposed to do.
Charles Abbott, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law and an M.A. candidate at the American 
University School of International Service, 
and Santiago Vázquez, an LL.M. student 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, collaborated on this inter-
view for the Human Rights Brief. Both are 
Dean’s Fellows at the Academy on Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law. HRB
EnDnotEs: Interview: Dinah shelton, A new Commissioner at the Inter-American Commission on 
 Human Rights
1 Editor’s Note: Victor Abramovich served as a Commissioner 
from Argentina and was the Second Vice-President of the Inter-
American Commission. He won 19 of the 20 votes needed to win 
reelection.
2 Abramovich was the thematic rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples 
and was a country rapporteur for Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua. See Organization of American States, 
Biographies of OAS Officials: Victor Abromovich, http://www.oas.
org/documents/spa/biography_Victor_Abramovich.asp.
